The productivity slowdown and the declining labor share: a neoclassical exploration by Grossman, Gene M. et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1504 
October 2017 
The Productivity Slowdown and the Declining Labor 
Share: A Neoclassical Exploration 
Gene M. Grossman 
Elhanan Helpman 
Ezra Oberfield 
Thomas Sampson 
Abstract 
We explore the possibility that a global productivity slowdown is responsible for the widespread 
decline in the labor share of national income. In a neoclassical growth model with endogenous human 
capital accumulation a la Ben Porath (1967) and capital-skill complementarity a la Grossman et al. 
(2017), the steady-state labor share is positively correlated with the rates of capital-augmenting and 
labor-augmenting technological progress. We calibrate the key parameters describing the balanced 
growth path to U.S. data for the early post-war period and find that a one percentage point slowdown 
in the growth rate of per capita income can account for between one half and all of the observed 
decline in the US labor share. 
Keywords: neoclassical growth, balanced growth, technological progress, capital-skill 
complementarity, labor share, capital share 
JEL: O40; E25 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Growth Programme.  The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
We thank are grateful to Ben Bridgman, Andrew Glover, Chad Jones, Jacob Short, Gianluca Violante and 
Ariel Weinberger for discussions and Suggestions. Oberfield thanks the Washington Center for Equitable 
Growth for financial support.  
Gene M. Grossman, Princeton University. Elhanan Helpman, Harvard University and CIFAR. 
Ezra Oberfield, Princeton University. Thomas Sampson, London School of Economics and Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics.  
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 G.M. Grossman, E. Helpman, E. Oberfield and T. Sampson, submitted 2017. 
1 Introduction
The labor share in national income has fallen dramatically in the United States and elsewhere
in recent years. The decline began by at least 2000, and probably earlier. Meanwhile, measured
productivity growth slowed noticeably over roughly the same period. In this paper, we explore
the possibility that these two, seemingly-unrelated phenomena might in fact be connected by
a process of neoclassical growth with endogenous human capital accumulation.
The decline in the labor share has been documented and discussed by many researchers,
including Elsby et al. (2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Bridgman (2014), Rognlie
(2015), Lawrence (2015), Koh et al. (2016), Barkai (2016), Kehrig and Vincent (2017), and
others. The precise magnitude of the drop is unclear and the starting date almost impossible to
pinpoint, for a number of reasons. Elsby et al. (2013) and Karabarbounis and Neiman outline
the difficulties associated with attributing self-employment income to either capital or labor.
Barkai (2016) discusses the evolution of the profit share, which he distinguishes from payments
to capital and labor. Bridgman (2014) and Rognlie (2015) note the distinction between gross
and net capital shares, and the problems that arise in measuring depreciation, especially for
intangible assets. Koh et al. (2016) focus on obstacles to assessing the returns to intellectual
property. Despite these many caveats, a consensus has emerged that the labor share in the
United States has sustained a substantial and prolonged decline on the order of five or six
percentage points. This observation upsets one of the Kaldor (1961) facts about the long-
run stability of aggregate factor shares. Moreover, as Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and
Piketty and Zucman (2014) emphasize, the tilt in the income distribution undoubtedly has been
a global phenomenon.
We do not intend to wade into the debate about timing or magnitude, which already reflects
a great deal of careful data work. But to set the stage for our later discussion, we depict in
Figure 1 the evolution of the labor share in the United States as reported by the BLS. The
figure shows the share of labor compensation including wages, salaries and employer-contributed
benefits in the non-farm business sector and in the nonfinancial corporate sector.1 Clearly, it is
1Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) argue that factor shares in the corporate sector are less subject to mea-
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difficult to identify a precise starting point for any decline, but the figure shows that the labor
share has fallen noticeably since 2000. Figure 2 depicts the global trends. Here, we have used
international data on labor compensation from the Penn World Tables and on compensation
in the corporate sector from Karabarbounis and Neiman and have regressed the reported labor
share in 125 and 66 countries, respectively, on country and year fixed effects. The figure plots
the time effects, namely the common component in world trends. We find clear support for
Karabarbounis and Neiman’s and Piketty and Zucman’s conclusion that a fall in the labor share
has occurred worldwide.
Figure 1: US Labor Share
Source: BLS (https://www.bls.gov/lpc). Labor compensation includes wages and salaries of
employees plus employers contributions for social insurance and private benefit plans, and all
other fringe benefits in current dollars. For the nonfarm business sector, an estimate of the
wages, salaries, and supplemental payments of the self-employed is included.
The trends in U.S. and world productivity growth are even more controversial. Researchers
have debated the magnitude of the slowdown, whether it is a cyclical or secular phenomenon,
and what is the inception date (if any) of the long-run decline. Gordon (2010, 2012, 2016)
has argued most forcefully that productivity growth slowed permanently in the United States
beginning in the 1970’s and that the average annual growth rate of total factor productivity
(TFP) in the last four decades has been at least one percentage point slower than in the
preceding five decades. Fernald (2014) reports slower growth in TFP and labor productivity
from 1973 to 1995 than in the preceding 25 years, followed by a decade of exceptional growth
surement error that derives from the imputation of labor earnings in unincorporated enterprises.
2
Figure 2: Global Labor Share
Sources: Compensation Share from Penn World Tables 9.0 and Corporate Labor Share from
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Compensation includes only wages and salaries of employ-
ees. Each series plots time fixed effects from a regression of labor shares on time fixed effects
and country fixed effects, weighted by real GDP. The compensation is calculated using 125
countries, and the corporate labor share series is calculated using 66 countries. OPEC countries
are excluded from both.
performance, and then a return to the earlier, slower rate of progress during the Great Recession
and beyond. Jorgenson et al. (2014) concur that high rates of productivity growth during the
period from 1995 to 2005 were transitory and exceptional, and that trend productivity growth
probably has slowed since then. Some, like Mokyr (2014), Feldstein (2017), and Brynjolfsson
and McAfee (2011, 2014) contend that efforts to measure productivity growth are hampered
by enormous difficulties in gauging output quality and the value of new products. They see
substantial underestimation of the recent record of productivity growth due to mismeasurement.
Bryne et al. (2016) and Syverson (2017) dispute these claims.
We cannot resolve these disputes either. Instead, we will accept the hypothesis that pro-
ductivity growth has slowed in recent decades and explore the potential implications of this for
the functional distribution of income. Again, just to fix ideas, we depict in Figure 3 the evo-
lution of U.S. labor productivity and U.S. TFP in the post-war years, using the data reported
by Fernald (2014). Of course, these data are subject to the critiques levied by Feldstein and
others. Notwithstanding, they suggest a slowdown in labor productivity growth beginning in
the early 1980’s. U.S. TFP, in contrast, seems to have undergone alternating periods of fast
and slow growth.
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Figure 3: US Productivity
Source: Fernald (2014).
We also repeat the exercise of regressing cross-national experiences on country and year
fixed effects. The systemic component is plotted in Figure 4. By this metric, global TFP
growth appears to have slowed starting in the late 1970s. So did labor productivity growth,
albeit less dramatically.
Figure 4: Global Productivity
Source: Penn World Tables 9.0. Each series plots time fixed effects from a regression of log
productivity on time fixed effects and country fixed effects, weighted by real GDP. The labor
productivity series is calculated using 166 countries, and the TFP series is calculated using 107
countries. OPEC countries are excluded from both.
Several explanations have been offered for the decline in the U.S. and global labor shares.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Piketty (2014) propose variants of what Rognlie (2015)
terms an “accumulation view.” Piketty argues that, for a variety of reasons, aggregate savings
have risen globally relative to national incomes, which has generated an increase in capital-to-
output ratios. Karabarbounis and Neiman call attention to a drop in the price of investment
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goods relative to consumer goods, which may have led to increased capital accumulation and
thereby a change in the capital share. As Rognlie (2015), Lawrence (2015), and Oberfield and
Raval (2015) point out, these explanations for the fall in the labor share require an aggregate
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in excess of one, which seems at odds with a
preponderance of the empirical evidence. Oberfield and Raval suggest, instead, a once-off shift
in the bias of technology in favor of capital. Of course, the bias in technology is impossible
to identify separately from the elasticity of substitution using time series data on inputs and
outputs, as Diamond and McFadden (1965) established long ago (see also Diamond et al., 1978).
Elsby (2013) points instead to the expansion of offshoring as a possible source of the income
shifts. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) suggest that automation of tasks previously performed
by labor can cause a permanent reduction in the labor share. Meanwhile, Autor et al. (2017)
and Kehrig and Vincent (2017) ascribe the fall in the labor share to the growing dominance of
“superstar firms.”
In this paper, we propose a novel explanation for the decline in the labor share. Before
doing so, we draw attention to yet another apparent break in the time series data, namely that
for the trend increase in educational attainment. The data reported by Goldin and Katz and
reproduced in Figure 5 show that educational attainment has been rising steadily for successive
birth cohorts in the United States for more than a century. However, the annual increase in
average years of schooling appears to have slowed in the post war years, which translates to a
deceleration of human capital accumulation in the adult male labor force after the mid-1970’s, as
reported by Jones (2016). We will argue that a productivity slowdown generates a deceleration
of human capital accumulation and a long-run decline in the labor share in income in a setting
of neoclassical growth with a certain form of capital-skill complementarity.
In what follows, we extend a standard neoclassical growth model to incorporate endogenous
human capital accumulation. The economy comprises overlapping generations of family mem-
bers that procreate and perish with constant probabilities. Newborns, who begin life without
any human capital, can accumulate skills by devoting time to education. Each living individual
divides her time optimally between working and learning. Meanwhile, competitive firms allo-
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Figure 5: U.S. Education by Birth Cohort and among Adult Labor Force
Sources: Years of schooling by birth cohort from Goldin and Katz (2007) and additional data
from Lawrence Katz., Years of Schooling of adult labor force from Jones (2016). Each series
includes only males.
cate capital to workers as a function of their skill levels. The output of a worker together with
the capital allocated to her is increasing in human capital. Optimal savings finance additions
to the capital stock, which depreciates at a constant rate.
Growth is sustained by exogenous technological progress. Technical progress in our model
takes three forms. Labor-augmenting technical progress raises the productivity of all workers
proportionally, independent of their skill level or their capital usage. Disembodied capital-
augmenting technical progress raises the productivity of all capital used in production irre-
spective of the number or type of workers that operate the machines. New machines embody
investment specific technical progress. On a balanced growth path associated with constant
rates of technical progress, capital, consumption and output grow at constant rates and the
factor shares in national income are constant.
We specify a class of production functions that is like the one we described in Grossman et al.
(2017). Production functions in this class exhibit constant returns to scale in the two physical
inputs, capital and labor time. We impose parameter restrictions to ensure that the marginal
product of human capital is everywhere positive and that the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor (for a worker of any skill level) is less than one. Critically, human capital
enters the production function in a manner that is akin to capital-using technical progress. That
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is, as skill levels grow, firms find it optimal to substitute capital for raw labor at any given factor
prices. This specification of the technology reflects an assumed capital-skill complementarity, a
feature of the aggregate production function that was first hypothesized by Griliches (1969) and
corroborated by many researchers since. As we showed in our earlier paper, the combination of
a technology in the specified class of production functions and the opportunity for endogenous
schooling allows for the existence of a balanced growth path even in the presence of capital-
augmenting technical progress and an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor that
is less than one.2
When we solve for the balanced growth path, we find simple analytical formulas for the
long-run factor shares. If we further assume—in keeping with the empirical evidence—that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one, then the labor share in national income
is an increasing function of the rates of capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technological
progress. Therefore, a productivity slowdown of any sort results in a decline in the steady-state
labor share. The mechanism operates through optimal schooling choices. When growth slows,
the real interest rate falls, which leads individuals to target a higher level of education for a
given level of the capital stock. Inasmuch as skills are capital using, this reduces the effective
capital to labor ratio in the typical firm, which in turn redistributes income from labor to
capital, given an elasticity of substitution less than one.
How important is this redistributive channel quantitatively? To answer this question, we
take parameters to match the average birth rate, the average death rate, the rate of labor
productivity growth, the internal rate of return on schooling, and the factor shares of the
pre-slowdown era in the United States, as well as a conservative estimate of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. One key parameter remains, which can be expressed either in terms
of the composition of technical progress in the pre-slowdown steady state or as a measure of
the capital-skill complementarity in the aggregate production function. We are cautious about
this parameter, because Diamond et al. (1978) tell us that it cannot be identified from time
series data on inputs and outputs, while our formula tells us that it plays a central role in
2That is, the Uzawa Growth Theorem (Uzawa, 1961) does not apply in circumstances where human capital
accumulates endogenously and capital and skills are complementary.
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our quantitative analysis. We consider a range of alternatives, including some derived from
estimation of the cross-industry and cross-regional relationships implied by our model. In all
of the alternatives we consider, a one percentage point slowdown in secular growth implies a
substantial redistribution of income shares from labor to capital, representing between one half
and all of the observed shift in factor shares in the recent U.S. experience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our neoclassical
growth model with perpetual youth and endogenous human capital accumulation, drawing on
Blanchard (1985) for the former and Ben Porath (1967) for the latter. Section 3 characterizes
the balanced growth path. In Section 4 we discuss the analytical relationship between rates
of capital and labor-augmenting technological progress and the long-run factor shares. Section
5 presents our quantitative exploration of how a one percentage point slowdown in the trend
growth rate might affect the distribution of income between capital and labor. Section 6 offers
some further thoughts.
2 A Neoclassical Growth Model with Endogenous Education
In this section we develop a simple neoclassical, overlapping-generations (OLG) model with ex-
ogenous capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technological progress, endogenous capital
accumulation a` la Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), and endogenous edu-
cation a` la Ben Porath (1967). Our model features perpetual youth, as in Blanchard (1985),
and capital-skill complementarity, as in Grossman et al. (2017). The economy admits a unique
balanced growth path despite ongoing capital-augmenting technical progress and an assumed
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of less than one. We use the model to ex-
plore the long-run implications for factor shares of a once-and-for-all slowdown in productivity
growth.
The economy is populated by a unit mass of identical family dynasties.3 The representative
dynasty comprises a continuum Nt of individuals at time t. Each living individual generates
3We assume here that families maximize dynastic utility, including the discounted well-being of unborn gener-
ations. The qualitative results would be much the same in a Yaari (1965) economy with (negative) life insurance
and no bequests, as developed in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch.3).
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a new member of her dynasty with a constant, instantaneous probability λdt in a period of
length dt and faces a constant instantaneous probability of demise νdt in that same period,
with λ > 0, ν ≥ 0. With these constant hazard rates of birth and death, the size of a dynasty
at time t is given by
Nt = e
(λ−ν)(t−t0)Nt0 .
New cohorts begin life without any accumulated human capital. Every individual is endowed
at each instant with one unit of time that she can divide arbitrarily between working and
learning. Work yields a wage that reflects the state of technology and the size of the aggregate
capital stock, as well as the individual’s accumulated human capital, h. Learning occurs at
full-time school or in continuing education. An individual who works for a fraction `t of her
unit of time at t and devotes the remaining fraction 1− `t of her time to education accumulates
human capital according to
h˙t = 1− `t. (1)
The time constraint implies `t ∈ [0, 1].
The representative family maximizes dynastic utility,
Ut0 =
∫ ∞
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)Nt
c1−ηt − 1
1− η dt ,
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint, where ct is per capita consumption by family
members at time t, η is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and ρ is the
subjective discount rate. As usual, the Euler equation implies
c˙t
ct
=
ιt − ρ
η
, (2)
where ιt is the real interest rate in terms of consumption goods at time t. To limit the number
of cases and to conform with widespread empirical evidence, we assume henceforth that η > 1.4
4See, for example, Hall (1988), Campbell (2003) and Yogo (2004) for estimates using macro data, and At-
tanasio and Weber (1993) and Vissing and Jorgenson (2002) for estimates using micro data.
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We also assume that the discount rate is sufficiently large to render dynastic utility finite.5
Firms hire capital and workers to produce a single, homogeneous final good. Consider a
firm that employs K units of capital and L workers, each of whom has the same human capital,
h. With the technology available at time t, such a firm can produce
Y = F (AtK,BtL, h)
units of output, where At represents the state of disembodied, capital-augmenting technology,
Bt is the state of labor-augmenting technology, and F (·) is homogeneous of degree one in its first
two arguments; i.e., there are constant returns to scale in the two physical inputs.6 Following
Grossman et al. (2017), we assume that F (·) falls within a particular class of production
functions and we impose certain parameter restrictions. Specifically, we adopt
Assumption 1 The production function can be written as F (AtK,BtL, h) = F˜
(
e−ahAtK, ebhBtL
)
,
with a > 0, b > λ ≥ 0, where
(i) F˜ (·) is homogeneous of degree one in AtK and BtL;
(ii) f (k) ≡ F˜ (k, 1) is strictly increasing, twice differentiable, and strictly concave for all k;
(iii) σKL ≡ FKFL/FFKL < 1 for all K,L, and h; and
(iv) limk→0 kf ′ (k) /f (k) < b/ (a+ b).
The functional-form assumption makes schooling like capital-using (or labor-saving) technical
progress; i.e., an increase in human capital raises the demand for capital relative to that for raw
labor at the initial factor prices. As we discussed in Grossman et al. (2017) this assumption
5In particular, we require
ρ > λ− ν + (1− η) gy (3)
where gy is the growth rate of per capita income along the balanced growth path. We will express gy in terms
of the fundamental paramaters below.
6With constant returns to scale, the total output of a firm that hires a variety of workers with heterogenous
levels of human capital is simply the sum of the amounts produced by the various groups that have a common
h using the capital that is optimally allocated to them.
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about technology provides for the existence of a balanced growth path in the presence of capital-
augmenting technical progress, even when the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor is strictly less than one. Assumption 1.iii imposes this restriction on the elasticity of
substitution, which is in keeping with the preponderance of empirical evidence. Moreover, with
our functional form, σKL < 1 implies that d (Fh/FL) /dK > 0; i.e., that capital accumulation
boosts the marginal product of human capital relative to the marginal product of raw labor, a
form of capital-skill complementarity that also is consistent with empirical research (see Goldin
and Katz, 2007). Assumption 1.iv ensures that the marginal product of human capital is
positive for all K L, and h.7
Final output can be used either for consumption or investment. A unit of output produces
one unit of the consumption good or qt units of the investment good at time t, where growth
in qt captures investment-specific technological change, as in Greenwood et al. (1997). Thus,
Yt = Ct + It/qt
and
K˙t = It − δKt ,
where Ct and Kt are aggregate consumption and the aggregate capital stock, respectively, It is
gross investment, and δ is the constant rate of capital depreciation.
Technology evolves exogenously in our model. Let γL = B˙/B be the constant rate of
labor-augmenting technological progress, gA = A˙/A the constant rate of disembodied capital-
augmenting progress, and gq = q˙/q the constant rate of embodied (or investment-specific)
technological progress. Define γK ≡ gA+gq as the total rate of capital-augmenting technological
progress. We are interested in the relationship between γK and γL and the steady-state capital
and labor shares, θ and 1− θ.
7An alternative but formally equivalent way to express the class of production functions specified by Assump-
tion 1 is
F (AtK,BtL, h) = (BtL)
1−β F
(
AtK, e
µhBtL
)β
,
with β = b/ (a+ b) and µ = a+ b.
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3 Characterizing the Balanced Growth Path
In order to solve for a balanced growth path (BGP) we impose the following parameter restric-
tions
Assumption 2 The parameters of the economy satisfy
(i) a > γK ;
(ii) limk→0
kf ′(k)
f(z) >
Ω
1+Ω > limk→∞
zf ′(k)
f(k) , where Ω ≡ b−λa −
(η−1)(γL+ b−λa γK)+ρ−(λ−ν)
a−γK ;
(iii) (η − 1) (γL + b−λa γK)+ ρ− (λ− ν) > 0.
Assumption 2 is needed to ensure the existence of a unique BGP with finite dynastic utility. It
also generates interior choices for the optimal labor supply among those that have completed
their full-time schooling.
The competitive firms take the rental rate for capital, Rt, as given. A firm that hires one
unit of labor with human capital h at time t combines that labor with κt (h) units of physical
capital, where κt (h) is determined implicitly by
e−ahAtF˜K
[
e−ahAtκt (h) , ebhBt
]
= Rt. (4)
The worker is paid her marginal product which, with constant returns to scale, is the difference
between revenue and capital costs, or
Wt (h) = F˜ (·)− e−ahAtκt (h) F˜K (·) . (5)
Individuals use the wage schedule Wt (h), together with their rational expectations of the evo-
lution of wages and the interest rate to make their schooling decisions.
Considering that there is a continuum of members of every dynasty and that families max-
imize dynastic utility, each individual chooses the path of her time allocation {`t} to maximize
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the expected present value of earnings. For an individual born at time τ , the problem is
max
∫ ∞
τ
e−
∫ t
τ (ιz+ν)dz`tWt (ht) dt
subject to hτ = 0, h˙t = 1− `t, and 0 ≤ `t ≤ 1. Let µt be the co-state variable associated with
human capital accumulation. Then the first-order conditions imply
Wt (ht) < µt
Wt (ht) = µt
Wt (ht) > µt
⇒

`t = 0
`t ∈ [0, 1]
`t = 1
(6)
and
µ˙t = (ιt + ν)µt − `tW ′t (ht) . (7)
Let us define a balanced growth path (BGP) as a dynamic equilibrium with constant rates of
growth of output, consumption, and capital, and with income shares for capital and labor that
are both constant and strictly positive. We find such a BGP by a process of “guess and verify.”
We hypothesize that the optimal schooling choices for all members of each new cohort entail
full-time participation in schooling until the students accumulate human capital equal to a time-
varying threshold h∗t , followed by entry into the workforce, albeit with continuing education that
keeps individuals’ human capital equal to the growing threshold. These schooling strategies,
which we indeed find to be optimal given Assumption 2.i, are depicted in Figure 6. Here,
the lines with unit slope represent the human capital accumulation of each cohort during the
periods that its members are full-time students. Once a cohort’s human capital reaches h∗t ,
its members devote a fraction γK/a of their time to education, just like all others that have
finished their full-time schooling. This schooling behavior implies that all workers in the labor
force share a common level of human capital ht = h
∗
t , irrespective of their birth dates. As a
result, firms allocate the same amount of physical capital to all workers. Needless to say, this
feature of the model simplifies aggregation across cohorts substantially.
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Figure 6: Human Capital Accumulation by Birth Cohort
We further conjecture that the interest rate, ι, is constant along the BGP, as is the division
of time between work and education, `, for those that have already entered the workforce. We
prove in the appendix the following lemma that describes important features of the balanced
growth path:
Lemma 1 Suppose gq, gA and γL are constants and Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Then
there exists a unique BGP characterized by
` = 1− γK
a
(8)
and
zt ≡ e
−ah∗tAtKt
ebh
∗
tBtLt
= z∗ for all t. (9)
Here, zt adjusts the effective capital-labor ratio at time t for the prevailing level of human
capital of those in the workforce, taking into account the different complementarity between
human capital and each of the primary factors of production. We henceforth refer to zt as the
schooling-adjusted effective capital-to-labor ratio.
Equation (8) implies that the human capital threshold grows linearly with time,
h˙∗t =
γK
a
. (10)
Let sτ denote the years in full-time school (or “educational attainment”) for those born at
time τ . This is the time it takes for them to catch up with the human capital threshold, i.e.,
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sτ = h
∗
τ+sτ . But, with the threshold growing according to (10), h
∗
τ+sτ = h
∗
τ + sτγK/a. Thus,
educational attainment also grows linearly with time,
s˙τ =
γK
a− γK ,
which closely approximates the findings of Goldin and Katz (2007).
Equation (9) implies that education is chosen so that the schooling-adjusted effective capital-
labor ratio remains constant along the BGP. This is the key to balanced growth in the presence
of capital-augmenting technological progress and an elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor less than one. As capital accumulates and becomes more productive, the capital share
in national income would tend to fall when σKL < 1. However, the capital-skill complementarity
implies an increase in the return to schooling. The extra schooling is capital-using, which puts
upward pressure on the capital share. With the functional form in Assumption 1, the offsetting
forces just balance, and the capital share remains constant.8
Why then is it optimal for active workers to upgrade their human capital continuously so
as to keep zt constant? For an interior choice of ` ∈ (0, 1), the present value of extra human
capital, µt must equal the opportunity cost of investment, which is the instantaneous wage,
Wt (ht); see equation (6). But then if ι, `, and gW are constant, as conjectured, (7) implies
`W ′t (h∗t )
ι+ ν − gW = Wt (h
∗
t ) . (11)
But Assumption 1 delivers
W ′t (ht)
Wt (ht)
= b− a θ [zt (ht)]
1− θ [zt (ht)] , (12)
where θ (zt) ≡ ztf ′ (zt) /f (zt) is the capital share. Notice that the capital share depends only
on the schooling-adjusted capital-to-labor ratio. So, a choice of h∗t that keeps zt constant also
keeps W ′t (h∗t ) /Wt (h∗t ) constant, which is consistent with (11).9
8Put differently, (10) implies that e−ah
∗
tAtqt is constant along the balanced growth path. So, the induced
investment in human capital is just what is needed to offset the exogenous improvement in capital productivity.
9Note that for (12) to be satisfied with a constant value of zt, we need a sufficiently large range for zf
′ (z) /f (z).
We show in the appendix that Assumption 2.ii guarantees the existence of an interior solution to (12).
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Using the optimal allocation of time to school and work, we can now calculate the (constant)
growth rates of the labor force, wages, and output per capita, along with the constant interest
rate and capital share. The aggregate labor force at time t is the product of the fraction of time
that the typical worker devotes to gainful employment and the mass of the surviving population
that has completed the phase of full-time schooling. The measure of individuals that were born
at τ and that are still alive at time t is λNτe
−ν(t−τ) = λNte−(λ−ν)(t−τ)e−ν(t−τ) = λNte−λ(t−τ).
All those who were born at or before t− h∗t have already entered the labor force. Therefore,
Lt =
(
1− γK
a
)∫ t−h∗t
−∞
λNte
−λ(t−τ)dτ
=
(
1− γK
a
)
Nte
−λh∗t . (13)
It follows from (13) that labor-force participation, Lt/Nt, changes at the rate gL − gN =
−λγK/a < 0. Declining labor-force participation mirrors the increasing educational attainment,
which requires a longer initial stay in school for each new cohort.
Next we derive the growth rate of wages. Compensation grows thanks to ongoing techno-
logical progress, as well as ongoing investments in physical and human capital. Using (4) and
(5), we calculate that, along a BGP, the wage paid to each worker in the labor force (who has
growing human capital of h∗t ) increases at the rate10
gW = γL +
b
a
γK .
10We substitute for the arguments of F˜ (·) and F˜K (·) using z = e−(a+b)h∗tAtκt (h∗t ) /Bt and note that z
is constant along a balanced growth path. The no-arbitrage condition for capital accumulation implies that
Rtqt− q˙t/qt− δ = ιt, and thus, on a BGP with a constant interest rate and a constant rate of investment-specific
technical progress, R˙t/Rt = −gq. Totally differentiating (4) and (5) with z constant implies
−gq = gA − ah˙∗t
and
W˙t
Wt
= γL + bh˙
∗
t ,
from which it follows that
W˙t
Wt
= γL +
b
a
γK .
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Since factor shares are constant along the BGP, aggregate output is proportional to labor
income, so the growth rate of output per capita can be expressed as
gy = gW + gL − gN
= γL +
b− λ
a
γK .
Combining this expression with Assumption 2.iii implies the finite utility restriction (3) holds
on the BGP. Also, per capita consumption is proportional to per capita output, so (2) gives
the long-run interest rate as
ι = ρ+ ηgy
= ρ+ η
(
γL +
b− λ
a
γK
)
. (14)
Finally, we come to the steady-state factor shares. In the steady state, (11) and (12) imply
γL +
b
a
γK = ι+ ν −
(
1− γK
a
)(
b− a θ
1− θ
)
or
θ
1− θ =
b+ γL − (ι+ ν)
a− γK . (15)
Next we substitute for the long-run interest rate, using (14), which gives us a relationship
between the long-run capital share and the primitive parameters of the economy, namely
θ
1− θ =
b− λ
a
− (η − 1)
(
γL +
b−λ
a γK
)− λ+ ν + ρ
a− γK . (16)
We summarize our characterization of the long-run equilibrium as follows:
Proposition 1 Suppose the aggregate production function obeys Assumption 1, the parameters
satisfy Assumption 2 and gq, gA and γL are constant. Then on the unique balanced growth
path new cohorts are full-time students until their human capital reaches a threshold h∗t that
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grows linearly with time. Once a cohort enters the labor force, its members devote a fraction
` = 1− γK/a of their time to work and the remaining time to ongoing education. Wages grow
at constant rate γL + (b/a) γK and per capita income grows at constant rate γL + (b− λ) γK/a.
The long-run real interest rate is given by (14) and the long-run capital share is determined by
(16).
4 Technological Progress and Factor Shares
We are ready to discuss the relationship between the parameters γL and γK that describe
the rate and nature of technological progress and the long-run distribution of national income
between capital and labor. Let us begin with (15), which expresses θ as a function of γK and
γL, taking the real interest rate as given. If, for example, the aggregate economy comprises a
continuum of small regional economies that face a common interest rate due to nationwide asset
trade, then (15) would describe the cross-sectional relationship between regional growth rates
of output and factor shares. From this equation, it is clear that θ would be positively correlated
with both γK and γL in the cross section; regions with faster rates of capital or labor-augmenting
technological progress would have higher shares of their income paid to capital in a world with
equalized interest rates.
But in a closed economy (or a global economy), the real interest rate is endogenous and
responds to changes in the growth process. Equation (16) informs us about the long-run rela-
tionship between factor shares and rates of technological progress. Recall our assumption that
η > 1, i.e., that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one. By differentiating
the expression on the-right hand side of (16) and making use of Assumption 2.iii, which ensures
finite dynastic utility, we establish our key result:
Proposition 2 When η > 1, a decrease in γK or γL reduces the long-run labor share.
In other words, a productivity slowdown—no matter whether it is caused by a reduction in the
pace of labor-augmenting technological progress, the pace of disembodied capital-augmenting
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technological progress, or the pace of investment-specific technological progress—will shift the
distribution of national income from labor to capital.
What accounts for this shift in factor shares? Note first from (14) that, in response to an
exogenous change in the growth process, the interest rate moves in the same direction as the
growth rate of per capita income. Moreover, with η > 1, the response of the former is greater
than that of the latter. Thus, a productivity slowdown that causes gy to fall will cause ι−gy to
fall as well. On a BGP, wages grow almost at the same rate as per capita income, so ι−gW falls.
This term appears of course in the expression for the optimal human capital threshold (11);
whereas a decline in the growth rate of wages makes staying in school less desirable, a decline
in the interest rate makes extended schooling more palatable. The latter effect dominates, so
by a combination of (11) and (12), z∗ eventually falls. In other words, we find that the long-
run schooling-adjusted effective capital-to-labor ratio declines in response to secular stagnation,
due to the optimal choice of human capital and the greater complementarity of schooling with
physical capital than with raw labor. Finally, with an elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor of less than one, a decline in the schooling-adjusted effective capital-labor ratio spells
a decline in the labor share.
It is worth emphasizing the contrast between the mechanism that we propose here to account
for the declining labor share and an explanation that relies on the canonical neoclassical theory
of the functional distribution of income, as first elucidated by John Hicks (1932) and Joan
Robinson (1933). The canonical approach begins with a constant-returns-to-scale, two-factor,
production function, F (AK,BL). Then, if factors are paid their marginal products, the change
in the ratio of factor shares is given by
d ln
(
θ
1− θ
)
=
σKL − 1
σKL
(
d ln
K
L
+ d ln
A
B
)
.
Suppose σKL < 1, as suggested by a preponderance of the evidence. Then, an increase in
the capital share requires either a fall in the level of the capital-labor ratio or a decline in the
level of A/B; i.e., a shift in technology that augments the productivity of labor relative to the
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productivity of capital. But Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) point to a global increase in
the capital-labor ratio, and Piketty and Zucman (2013) similarly point to an increase in the
capital-output ratio. So both are led to argue that σKL exceeds one in order to square these
observations with the decline in the labor share. Their claims in this vein have not found
widespread acceptance.
In our model with endogenous education and capital-skill complementarities, it is not the
levels of the technology parameters that determine the factor shares, but rather the rates of
technological change. Moreover, the factor bias of technical change does not play a critical role
in our story. Both a fall in the rate of labor-augmenting technological change and a fall in the
rate of capital-augmenting technological change will result in a long-run decline in the labor
share, because both have qualitatively similar effects on the optimal length of time in school.11
We will find in the next section that the quantitative effects of a productivity slowdown also
are similar no matter what form that slowdown takes.
5 A Quantitative Exploration
In this section, we assess the decline in the labor share that might be associated with a one
percentage point reduction in trend growth of per capita income. We rely on the empirical
literature to set some of our parameters and choose others to match moments from the U.S.
historical experience. However, we have no firm basis for specifying the magnitude of the
capital-skill complementarity that is reflected in the parameter a in the production function,
F˜
(
e−ahAtK, ebhBtL
)
. Given our other moments, this parameter would be pinned down if
we knew the bias of technical progress in the pre-slowdown period. But this bit of historical
information also proves elusive. To complete our exercise, we pursue two different approaches.
In Section 5.1, we introduce plausible but ad hoc assumptions about the bias in technical
progress along the initial BGP. In Section 5.2, we attempt to estimate the parameter a using
11A decline in the rate of capital-augmenting technological progress expands the long-run labor supply per
worker, `, whereas a decline in labor-augmenting technological progress does not. An increase in ` also enhances
the incentive for full-time students to delay their entry into the labor force, per (11) and (12), beyond the effect
of the decline in ι− gW .
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Table 1: Targeted Moments and Parameters
Parameter/Moment Value
Birth rate λ 1.54%
Death rate ν 0.76%
IRR on schooling ι 10%
Capital share θ 0.35
Growth in labor productivity γL +
b
aγK 0.024
Increase in schooling s˙τ =
γ
K
a−γK 0.088
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1η 0.5
cross-sectional data on U.S. regions and industries. In Section 5.3, we discuss the sensitivity of
our conclusions to our parameter choices.
Table 1 tabulates the parameters that we have specified and the moments that we have
targeted throughout our quantitative exercise. The birth rate and death rate are averages for
the United States for the period 1980-2010, as reported by the National Center for Health
Statistics. The internal rate of return on schooling is a central estimate from a large literature
on returns to investments in education; see, for example, the reviews by Card (1999) and
Heckman et al. (2006). The capital share in the United States fluctuated narrowly around 35%
in the period from 1950 to 1980, and perhaps beyond.12 Labor productivity in the nonfarm
business sector grew in the United States at an average compound rate of 2.4% per annum
from 1950 to 1980, according to the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Goldin and Katz
(2007) report a fairly steady, average annual increase in educational attainment for each new
birth cohort of 0.88 years per decade for those born between 1880 and 1945.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution plays an important role in our quantitative
analysis, as we shall see below. Estimates derived from macroeconomic data typically range
from 0 to 0.3; see, for example, Hall (1988), Campbell (2003), and Yogo (2004). Estimates
that make use of micro (household) data often are larger and vary more widely; for example,
those reported by Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Vissing-Jorgenson (2002) range from 0.5
12As we discussed in Section 1, there are various ways to measure factor shares, which vary especially with the
treatment of entrepreneurial income. Our target of 0.35 for the capital share is central in the literature, and our
bottom-line results are not very sensitive to small changes in this value.
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to 1.0. Attanasio and Weber (1993) and Guvenen (2006) have shown how such differences
between estimates using macro and micro data can arise due to liquidity constraints that may
limit the participation of many households in equity markets. The estimates using macro data
capture better the response of aggregate consumption growth to interest rates, which is the
pertinent margin in our model. Still, our estimate of the response of factor shares to changes
in productivity growth is quite sensitive to this crucial parameter. So as not to overstate
this response, we take a central and conservative estimate of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of 1/η = 0.5.
Finally, we need a value for the parameter a or, alternatively, values for the parameters γK
and γL that describe the bias in technical progress in the initial steady state. Alas, the Diamond-
McFadden “Impossibility Theorem” tells us that we cannot identify these parameters from time
series data. In the next section, we explore the implications of some ad hoc assumptions about
γK and γL, and also about which one declined during the most recent period of slower growth.
In the succeeding section, we employ cross-sectional data for U.S. regions and industries in a
crude attempt to estimate a directly.
5.1 Ad Hoc Assumptions about the Bias in Technical Progress
We have assumed that the economy was evolving along an initial BGP, with labor productivity
expanding at 2.4% per annum, before experiencing a once-and-for-all slowdown in productivity
growth. In this section, we explore the implications of plausible but ad hoc assumptions about
the bias of technical change in the pre-slowdown period. One simple assumption maintains
that technical change in this period was (Hicks)-neutral, so that γK = γL before the slowdown.
A second simple assumption is that the observed average decline in investment goods prices
of 2% per year represents the full extent of investment-specific technical change, and that the
remaining disembodied technological progress was factor neutral (gA = γL). We also need to
know the form taken by the productivity slowdown. We entertain two alternative assumptions.
At one extreme, we posit that only capital-augmenting technical progress decelerated, enough
so to generate a one percentage point per year decline in labor-productivity growth. At the
22
other extreme, we posit that only labor-augmenting technical progress slowed, again so as to
generate a one percentage point decline in labor-productivity growth.
Table 2 shows the implications of these alternative assumptions. The top panel assumes
equal rates of labor and capital augmenting technical progress of 1.1% per annum in the pre-
slowdown period. Then a reduction in the rate of labor-augmenting progress that generates a
one percent decline in the growth of labor productivity shifts about 3.3% of national income from
labor to capital relative to the baseline, whereas a reduction in the rate of capital-augmenting
technical progress shifts about 4.1% of national income. Only the latter type of productivity
slowdown can generate a deceleration of educational attainment in our model, such as has
been observed in the data. With these parameters, the annual increase in schooling slows to
0.20 years per decade. Note that Goldin and Katz (2007) report an annual increase of 0.16 per
decade for the cohorts born after 1947. The bottom panel in Table 2 takes instead a baseline for
capital-augmenting technical progress of 2.4% growth per year, comprising disembodied annual
gains of 0.4% and investment-specific technical progress of 2.0% per year. In this calculation,
the rate of labor-augmenting technical progress also is 0.4%. We see that the implied shifts
in income shares that result from a productivity slowdown are somewhat smaller in this case,
totalling 1.5% of national income if all of the slowdown is due to a reduction in γL and 3.0% in
the opposite extreme, when it is only capital-augmenting technical progress that slows.
Our ad hoc assumptions about the bias in technical progress along the initial BGP allow us
to back out the key parameters in the production function that reflect the strength of the capital-
skill complementarity. Given the parameter values listed in Table 1, we must have a = 0.134
and b = 0.163 in order for the steady-state of the model with neutral technical progress to
reproduce the aforementioned moments in the U.S. data. If technical progress instead was
biased toward capital, as assumed in the bottom panel, then the implied parameters of the
aggregate production function are a = 0.294 and b = 0.245. We have no real basis to judge the
plausibility of these alternative parameter values, so we proceed now to conduct some crude
estimation.
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Table 2: Response of Capital Share to Productivity Slowdown: Ad Hoc Examples
γK = γL = 1.1%⇒ a = 0.134
γK γL
Growth in
per capita
Income
Annual
Increase in
Schooling
Interest
Rate
Capital
Share
Baseline 1.1% 1.1% 2.3% 0.09 10.0% 0.35
γL ↓ 1.1% 0.1% 1.3% 0.09 8.0% 0.383
γK ↓ 0.3% 1.1% 1.4% 0.02 8.2% 0.391
gq = 2.0%, gA = γL = 0.4%⇒ a = 0.294
γK γL
Growth in
per capita
Income
Annual
Increase in
Schooling
Interest
Rate
Capital
Share
Baseline 2.4% 0.4% 2.3% 0.09 10.0% 0.35
γL ↓ 2.4% −0.6% 1.3% 0.09 8.0% 0.365
γK ↓ 1.2% 0.4% 1.3% 0.04 8.1% 0.368
5.2 Estimation of Production-Function Parameters using Cross-Sectional
Data
Our estimation strategy makes use of data from the BEA Regional Accounts for different states
and industries in the United States. To perform this estimation, we must assume that industries
in different states participate in an integrated national capital market and thus face a common
interest rate. We also assume, somewhat heroically, that different industries share the same
production-function parameter, a. We allow the technology parameter b to vary by industry
and we let the rates of capital and labor-augmenting technological progress differ by industry
and state.
We begin with equations (11) and (12), which together imply
(
b− a θ
1− θ
)
l = ι+ ν − gW .
This equation relates the ratio of the factor shares to the growth rate of wages and the interest
rate. Define θ¯ as the average labor compensation across industry and states, and ¯` as the
average fraction of time devoted to work.13 Taking a first-order approximation around
(
θ¯, ¯`
)
13We estimate ¯` by first computing average human capital accumulation
.
h¯ as the annualized change in the
average schooling among those working in a state-industry between 1970 and 2000 in the Census data and then
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and using ` = 1− h˙, we find
(
b− a θ¯
1− θ¯
)(
1− h˙
)
− a l¯(
1− θ¯)2 (θ − θ¯) = ι+ ν − gW .
This relationship provides the basis for our cross-sectional estimation. Let j denote an
industry and s a state. We perform the regression
1− θjs = αs + αj + ξj h˙js + βgWjs + εjs , (17)
where 1− θjs is the average labor share in a regional industry during a specified period, gWjs is
the growth rate of wages in that state-industry pair, and h˙js is the average annual increase in
years of schooling among those that work in the state-industry. The regression includes state
and industry fixed effects, and allows the coefficient on human capital accumulation to vary by
industry to reflect the assumption that b may vary by industry. The estimated coefficient of
interest is βˆ, because it allows us to identify a according to
aˆ = −
(
1− θ¯)2
l¯βˆ
.
In order to carry out the estimation of (17), we compute the labor share in each industry-
state pair from the BEA Regional Accounts by dividing total compensation by value added.14
We compute the growth rate of wages using total compensation divided by employment as
our measure of the wage. Finally, we derive a measure of schooling among workers in a state-
industry from data reported in the decennial census.
Before proceeding, we highlight several estimation issues. First, our data on wages are re-
plete with measurement error, due both to the high rate of imputation in the BEA accounts15
and to the fact that our wage data are reported as compensation per worker, rather than com-
pensation per hour, so that, for example, we cannot distinguish part-time from full-time workers
applying ¯`= 1−
.
h¯.
14Note that this measure excludes proprietors’ income.
15See White et al. (2017).
25
in our employment measure. Not only does the measurement error introduce attenuation bias
as usual, but if the extent of the measurement error has been increasing over time—as docu-
mented by White (2014) and inferred by Bils and Klenow (2017)—then our data construction
would mechanically induce a positive correlation between labor shares and wage growth. To
address this concern, we compute a second measure of wages from the decennial census by tak-
ing the average wage reported by those living in a given state and working in a given industry.
While these wages also are measured imperfectly, the measurement error is quite different in
nature: wages reported in the census may not reflect the actual wages paid, they do not include
benefits, and the sample of workers is not designed to be representative at the state-industry
level. We believe that the measurement error for state-industry wages derived from the census
is likely uncorrelated with that in the BEA wage data, inasmuch as the two have very different
sources. Accordingly, we can use either of the wages series as an instrument for the other.
Second, we note that industry definitions changed from SIC classification to NAICS classi-
fication after 1997. To guard against the risk of confounding real changes with changes due to
reclassification, we elect to compute the regressions separately for the 1970-1997 period using
the SIC classification and for the 2000-2012 period using the NAICS classification.
Third, we find that our estimates are sensitive to the time horizon we use for calculating
wage changes and average factor shares. In particular, the longer is the window, the larger is
our estimate of a. This could well be explained by a slower adjustment of schooling choices to
underlying productivity trends than is suggested by our model. We believe that the estimates
that make use of longer horizons better capture the long-run changes that would be found in
the aggregate data. Accordingly, we choose to use the largest time windows that our data allow.
Table 3 presents our estimates for 1970-1997 using SIC industry classifications and for
2000-2012 using NAICS industry classifications, respectively.16 We consistently find an inverse
relationship between the average labor share in the state-industry and the average rate of wage
growth, as would be predicted by our model. Our preferred estimate appears in the second
16In all regressions, we have omitted observations for state-industry cells that include fewer than 100 workers.
In the appendix, we report a variety of additional regression results, which we have computed as a check on
robustness.
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Table 3: Wage Growth and Labor Shares
Panel A: SIC Classification, 1970-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -2.17∗∗∗ -4.45∗∗ -2.29∗∗ -7.38∗∗∗
(0.52) (1.54) (0.83) (1.70)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.19 0.093 0.18 0.056
Observations 1065 1065 1065 1065
Panel B: NAICS Classification, 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -1.05∗∗∗ -3.50∗ -0.71∗ -5.15∗∗∗
(0.28) (1.43) (0.28) (1.50)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.35 0.10 0.52 0.071
Observations 1107 1107 1107 1107
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Notes: Value Added, Labor Compensation and Employment for each state-industry-year from
the BEA Regional Accounts; Wages and Years of Schooling calculated from the Census for
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and from the ACS for 2000-2012. Labor share is average across years
of ratio of labor compensation to value added. State-industry-year cells with fewer than 100
observations are excluded from sample. Columns 1 and 2 use wage growth computed from BEA
as independent variable, whereas columns 3 and 4 use wage growth from Census. Columns 1
and 3 estimated by OLS, columns 2 and 4 by IV. Each regression includes state fixed effects,
industry fixed effects, and trends in years of state-industry schooling with coefficients that vary
by industry.
column of Panel A, where we have used the Census measure of wage growth as an instrument
for the BEA measure of wage growth. The first column of the top panel also provides an estimate
using the BEA measure of wage growth which may be attenuated because of measurement error.
These estimates imply a value of a ranging from 0.093 to 0.19. While there are reasons to prefer
the former, we use the two extreme estimates of a as the basis for further comparative-static
analysis.
In Table 4, we repeat the exercise of simulating the effects of a one percentage point slowdown
in annual labor-productivity growth. The upper panel uses the smaller value in our range of
estimates for a, while the lower panel uses the larger value. In this case, the values of γK and
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Table 4: Response of Capital Share to Productivity Slowdown: Estimates of Capital-Schooling
Complementarity using Cross-Sectional Data
Lower Bound Estimate of a: a = 0.093
γK γL
Growth in
per capita
Income
Annual
Increase in
Schooling
Interest
Rate
Capital
Share
Baseline 0.8% 1.3% 2.3% 0.09 10.0% 0.35
γL ↓ 0.8% 0.3% 1.3% 0.09 8.0% 0.396
γK ↓ 0.1% 1.3% 1.4% 0.01 8.2% 0.409
Upper Bound Estimate of a: a = 0.19
γK γL
Growth in
per capita
Income
Annual
Increase in
Schooling
Interest
Rate
Capital
Share
Baseline 1.5% 0.8% 2.3% 0.09 10.0% 0.35
γL ↓ 1.5% -0.2% 1.3% 0.09 8.0% 0.373
γK ↓ 0.6% 0.8% 1.4% 0.03 8.2% 0.379
γL in the baseline calibration are those needed for the model to match the annual increase
in schooling, the capital share, the rate of return on education, and the growth rate of labor
productivity in the pre-slowdown period. Again, we simulate the slowdown in labor-productivity
growth as being the result of either a deceleration of capital-augmenting technological progress
or of labor-augmenting technological progress.
We find that, for the range of values of a suggested by our estimation using state and
industry data, a one percentage point slowdown in trend productivity growth can account for
a sizeable shift in income from labor to capital. With the parameters reflected in the table, the
capital share rises between two and six percentage points.
5.3 Sensitivity of Results to Various Parameters
In a range of simulations, we find that the productivity slowdown might be responsible for a half
or more of the decline in the labor share in national income. How sensitive is this conclusion
to our parameter choices?
From equation (16), we see that
d
(
θ
1− θ
)
=
1− η
a− γK dgy +
(1− η) gy + λ− ν − ρ
(a− γK)2
dγK . (18)
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Consider the first term on the right-hand side of (18). We have assumed a one percentage point
decline in annual labor productivity growth, which fixes dgY/L = dgW . Moreover, (10) states
that h˙ = γK/a, and h˙ = 0.088 in the data. Therefore, a − γK ≈ a. It follows that the shift
in income associated with the first term is mostly governed by two parameters, a and η. We
have considered a range of possibilities for a. And we have taken a conservative estimate of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 0.5, which yields a value of η = 2. A smaller value
of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution would imply a larger value of η and therefore
a greater sensitivity of relative factor shares to a change in the per capita growth rate. The
second term in (10) applies only if the productivity slowdown was generated by a decline in
the rate of capital-augmenting technical progress. This term is positive (for dγK < 0) by (3),
which is the parameter restriction needed to ensure finite dynastic utility; so it only strengthens
the forces in our model. We conclude that, once we admit a reasonable amount of capital-skill
complementarity (as captured by the parameter a) a productivity slowdown can account for a
substantial redistribution of income from labor to capital for all plausible values of the other
parameters.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a novel explanation for part or all of the decline in the labor
share that has taken place in recent years. We added human capital accumulation a` la Ben
Porath (1967) to a plain-vanilla neoclassical growth model. In this setting, if human capital is
more complementary with physical capital than with raw labor and if the elasticity of substitu-
tion between physical capital and labor is less than one (holding constant the level of schooling),
then the rate of labor productivity growth and the share of labor in national income will be
positively correlated across steady states. Accordingly, a slowdown in productivity growth—
such as has apparently occurred in the recent period—can lead to a shift in the functional
distribution of income away from labor and toward capital. The mechanism requires a fall in
the real interest rate, which has also been part of the recent experience. When the interest
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rate falls relative to the growth rate of wages, individuals target a higher level of human capital
for any given size of the capital stock and state of technology. When human capital is more
complementary to physical capital than to raw labor, the elevated human capital target implies
a greater relative demand for capital. With an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor less than one, the shift in relative factor demands generates a rise in the capital share at
the expense of labor. Moreover, if the productivity slowdown is associated with a deceleration
of declining investment-good prices or with a fall in the rate of disembodied capital-augmenting
technical progress, then the model predicts a slowdown in the annual expansion of educational
attainment, which also matches the data in recent economic history.
Our story has additional attractive features. First, unlike several of the other explanations
for the decline in the labor share, ours does not rely on considerations that are specific to
the United States. The shift in aggregate factor shares has been seen in the data for many
countries, especially among the advanced countries. The productivity slowdown also has been
a common phenomenon, at least in the OECD countries. Real interest rates have fallen globally.
And educational gains have slowed in many advanced countries. Our growth model, which we
developed for a closed economy, can be interpreted as applying to a global economy comprising
(at least) the technologically-advanced countries. A productivity slowdown that is common to
these leading-edge economies should generate a decline in the interest rate and, in the presence
of capital-skill complementarity, a widespread fall in the labor share.
Second, our model can reconcile the different conclusions about the size of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor found in, for example, Antra`s (2004), Klump et al.
(2007), and Oberfield and Raval (2015) on the one hand, and Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014) and Glover and Short (2017), on the other. The former studies estimate the elasticity of
substitution between capital and hours holding human capital fixed; i.e., after controlling for
schooling.17 They find an elasticity of substitution (which is σKL, in our notation) less than one.
The latter studies, in contrast, use cross-country differences in the movement of investment-
17Antra`s (2004) and Klump et al. (2007) use a measure of efficiency units of labor with constant quality by
augmenting hours with a measure of changes in the quality of the workforce due to increases in schooling and
experience. Oberfield and Raval (2015) use a measure of local wages that is computed as the local residual after
controlling for schooling and experience.
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good prices to identify the elasticity of substitution from heterogeneous changes in factor shares.
Using this approach, Karabarbounis and Neiman find an elasticity of substitution greater than
one. However, their estimation strategy does not control for changes in schooling, which also
vary across countries. Inherently, their method incorporates into the elasticity estimate the
adjustment in schooling that takes place in response to investment-good prices. Our model
implies that factor shares will be insensitive to the price of investment goods after controlling
for changes in the growth rate of wages and in the real interest rate, which amounts to a unitary
aggregate elasticity of substitution after allowing for human-capital adjustment. When Glover
and Short (2017) re-estimate the Karabarbounis and Neiman regression of changes in the capital
share on changes in the relative price of investment goods and changes in the growth rate of
consumption (but also without controlling for changes in schooling), they find an aggregate
elasticity of substitution that indeed is not statistically different from one.18
Third, our mechanism is quite consistent with some recent empirical findings on the effects
of financial deregulation on the demand for higher education and on the labor share. Sun and
Yannelis (2016) and Leblebiciog˘lu and Weinberger (2017) both use the staggered deregulation
of the banking industry across states of the United States as a natural experiment to study
the effects of credit market frictions. Sun and Yannelis find that college enrollment and com-
pletion increase significantly in response to an expansion in available household credit after
banking deregulation. Leblebiciog˘lu and Weinberger find that state-wide labor shares declined
in response to local banking deregulation.19 Both of these findings are exactly what would
be predicted by our model if deregulation generates a decline in the real interest rate facing
households when they make their schooling decisions.
18Glover and Short (2017) argue that the standard neoclassical growth model (without human capital accu-
mulation) implies a relationship between the capital share and the rental rate of capital that is mediated by the
elasticity of substitution. Neither Karabarbounis and Neiman nor Glover and Short have access to cross-country
date on rental rates. Karabarbounis and Neiman use the price of investment goods as a proxy, but Glover and
Short point out that the intertemporal Euler equation implies that the rental rate reflects not only this relative
price, but also the rate of consumption growth.
19In the canonical neoclassical theory, an exogenous decline in the relative price of capital goods and an
exogenous fall in the real interest rate have qualitatively similar impacts on factor shares, because both reduce
the rental rate of capital. In our model, these shocks affect factor shares differently due to the human capital
response. A decline in the relative price of capital leaves factor shares unchanged after the subsequent adjustment
of schooling, whereas a decline in the real interest rate reduces the labor share, because it increases the desired
level of human capital relative to the effective capital-labor ratio.
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Figure 7: Historical Labor Share
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Sources: US labor share for 1899-1948 from Kuznets (1952) and for 1949-2014 from BLS;
UK labor share from Clark (2010), US labor productivity from Robert Gordon, UK Labor
Productivity from Bank of England, “A Millennium of Macroeconomic Data,” (available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/datasets/default.aspx).
Finally, we have focused in this paper on exploring a potential explanation for recent trends
in the labor share. But it is possible that our story holds broader sway in economic history.20
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the labor share in the United States and the United Kingdom
since the beginning of the twentieth century and the evolution of labor productivity in each
country over the same period. Evidently, these two variables have been temporally correlated
throughout modern history. For example, the period from 1900 until approximately 1930 was
a period of slow productivity growth in the United States and United Kingdom. It was also a
period of an historically low labor share. When productivity growth subsequently accelerated,
the labor share rose in tandem. While we are cautious about drawing firm conclusions from
such casual observations, it is possible that productivity growth and the functional distribution
of income have been linked for quite some time.21
20Interestingly, Franck and Galor (2017) provide evidence that investments in the steam engine were comple-
mentary to human capital in early post-industrial France. The authors find that regions that used steam engines
more intensively had more teachers, a greater share of children attending primary school, a greater fraction
of apprentices in the population, a greater share of literate conscripts, and greater public outlays for primary
schools.
21Using a frequency domain analysis, Growiec et al. (2016) establish that the (dominant) medium-run com-
ponent of the U.S. labor share from 1929 through 2015 is strongly pro-cyclical.
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Appendix for “The Productivity Slowdown and the Declining
Labor Share: A Neoclassical Exploration”
by
Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, Ezra Oberfield and Thomas
Sampson
Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1
The first step in solving for the BGP is to show that there exists a threshold human capital
level h∗t such that at time t all individuals with human capital below h∗t devote all their time
to schooling and all individuals with human capital above h∗t work full-time.
Consider an individual with human capital ht at time t and labor supply path `τ for τ ≥ t.
Let ˜`τ be an alternative labor supply path defined by
˜`
τ =

`τ + , τ ∈ [t, t+ ∆] ,
`τ − , τ ∈ (t+ ∆, t+ 2∆] ,
`τ , τ > t+ 2∆.
where  ∈ R and ∆ > 0. The individual’s human capital under labor supply path ˜`τ is given by
h˜τ =

hτ − (τ − t), τ ∈ [t, t+ ∆] ,
hτ −  (t+ 2∆− τ) , τ ∈ [t+ ∆, t+ 2∆] ,
hτ , τ ≥ t+ 2∆.
Note that human capital is unaffected outside the interval (t, t+ 2∆).
Let S be the difference between the individual’s expected present value of earnings under
˜`
τ and under `τ . We have
1
S =
∫ t+2∆
t
e−
∫ τ
t (ιs+ν)ds
[
˜`
τWτ (h˜τ )− `τWτ (hτ )
]
dτ,
=
∫ t+∆
t
e−
∫ τ
t (ιs+ν)ds {`τ (Wτ [hτ − (τ − t)]−Wτ [hτ ]) + Wτ [hτ − (τ − t)]} dτ
+
∫ t+2∆
t+∆
e−
∫ τ
t (ιs+ν)ds {`τ (Wτ [hτ −  (t+ 2∆− τ)]−Wτ [hτ ])− Wτ [hτ −  (t+ 2∆− τ)]} dτ,
where the second equality uses the expressions for ˜`τ and h˜τ above. Expressing the functions in
the integrands in terms of Taylor series around t, computing the integrals and dropping terms
that are o(∆2) implies that for ∆ close to zero we have
S ≈ ∆2
[
(ιt + ν)Wt(ht)−W ′t(ht)−
∂Wt(ht)
∂t
]
. (19)
The intuition for this expression is as follows. If  > 0, choosing ˜`τ instead of `τ means
increasing labor supply today and reducing labor supply tomorrow. The benefit of this change
is (ιt+ν)Wt(ht), which gives the increase in the expected present value of earnings from bringing
forward the date at which labor income is received. The costs of working more today and less
tomorrow are: W ′t(ht), which captures the reduction in earnings resulting from the individual
having lower human capital tomorrow, and; ∂Wt(ht)∂t , which reflects the increase in wages over
time.
Equation (12) gives W ′t (ht). By differentiating the wage function (5) we also obtain
∂Wt(ht)
∂t
=
{
γL +
(
gA − R˙t
Rt
)
θ [zt (ht)]
1− θ [zt (ht)]
}
Wt(ht),
where θ(z) ≡ zf ′(z)/f(z) and zt(h) ≡ e−(a+b)h Atκt(h)Bt . Substituting these expressions into (19)
yields
S ≈ ∆2Wt(ht)
[
ιt + ν − b− γL +
(
a+
R˙t
Rt
− gA
)
θ [zt (ht)]
1− θ [zt (ht)]
]
. (20)
Assumption 1 implies θ(z) is strictly decreasing in z as shown in Grossman et al. (2017).
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Rearranging equation (4) which characterizes optimal capital use we also have
Rt = e
−ahtAtf ′ [zt(ht)] , (21)
and differentiating this expression with respect to ht implies zt is strictly decreasing in ht. It
follows that θ [zt (ht)] /(1− θ [zt (ht)]) is strictly increasing in ht.
Assume a+ R˙t/Rt − gA > 0 and that there exists a finite, strictly positive h∗t such that
ιt + ν − b− γL +
(
a+
R˙t
Rt
− gA
)
θ [zt (h
∗
t )]
1− θ [zt (h∗t )]
= 0, (22)
implying the right hand side of (20) equals zero. We will prove below that these assumptions
hold on a BGP. Given a + R˙t/Rt − gA > 0, the right hand side of equation (20) is strictly
increasing in ht if and only if  > 0. Consequently, individuals with human capital below
h∗t have a strictly higher expected present value of earnings under labor supply path ˜`τ than
under `τ whenever  < 0. Likewise, individuals with human capital above h
∗
t have a strictly
higher expected present value of earnings under ˜`τ than `τ whenever  > 0. Low human
capital individuals prefer to study today and work tomorrow, while the opposite is true for high
human capital individuals. Since labor supply is bounded on the interval [0, 1] it follows that
the individual’s optimal labor supply is given by `t = 0 if ht < h
∗
t and `t = 1 if ht > h
∗
t .
Now, consider a BGP. Recall that we define a BGP as a dynamic equilibrium with constant
rates of growth of output, consumption and capital and constant factor shares of income. The
Euler equation (2) implies the real interest rate ιt is constant on a BGP. The real interest rate
must also equal the return from purchasing the investment good which gives the no-arbitrage
condition
ιt = qtRt − δ − gq. (23)
The no-arbitrage condition implies that on a BGP R˙t/Rt = −gq. Therefore, a+ R˙t/Rt − gA =
a − γK which is strictly positive by Assumption 2.i. It follows that a + R˙t/Rt − gA > 0 on a
3
BGP as assumed above.
Equation (22) implies the human capital threshold for entering the workforce h∗t satisfies
θ [zt (h
∗
t )]
1− θ [zt (h∗t )]
=
b+ γL − (ι+ ν)
a− γK , (24)
showing that zt(h
∗
t ) = z
∗ must be constant on a BGP which proves equation (9) in Lemma 1.
Differentiating (21) with respect to time while holding zt(h
∗
t ) constant yields
h˙∗t =
γK
a
.
Therefore, in order for their human capital to increase at the same rate as h∗t , individuals at the
threshold human capital level must choose labor supply ` = 1 − γK/a as claimed in equation
(8) of Lemma 1.
At time t any individuals with human capital above h∗t work full-time and do not increase
their human capital. Consequently, on a BGP it is not possible for individuals to have human
capital above h∗t since h∗t is growing over time. Given this observation, the remaining properties
of the unique BGP can be derived as in the discussion following Lemma 1 in the paper. In
particular, equation (14) gives the real interest rate on the BGP and substituting (14) into (24)
gives (16) which defines the BGP value of θ and, therefore, also of z∗ and h∗t . Assumption 2.ii
guarantees there exists a finite, strictly positive h∗t that solves equation (16). This completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
Stability of the BGP
The economy’s behavior away from the BGP depends upon whether or not any individuals work
full-time. We will solve for the transition dynamics under the assumption that departures from
the BGP are sufficiently small that nobody chooses to work full-time. This means there will
always be a threshold human capital level h∗t such that individuals with human capital below
h∗t are in full-time education, individuals with human capital equal to h∗t have an interior labor
supply choice and there are no individuals with human capital above h∗t .
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The transition dynamics can be expressed in terms of four variables
z˜t ≡ e−(a+b)h∗t AtKt
BtLt
, (25)
c˜t ≡ e−gctct = e−(γL+
b−λ
a
γK)tct, (26)
h˜t ≡ h∗t −
γK
a
t, (27)
K˜t ≡ e−gKtKt = e−[gq+γL+
b−λ
a
γK+λ−ν]tKt. (28)
where gc and gK denote the BGP growth rates of consumption per capita and the capital
stock, respectively. Note that gK = gq + gc + λ − ν and that capital market clearing requires
z˜t = zt(h
∗
t ) in equilibrium. z˜t and c˜t are jump variables, while h˜t and K˜t are the economy’s two
state variables. All four variables are stationary on the BGP.
There are four differential equations that characterize the transition dynamics: the human
capital accumulation equation (1), the Euler equation (2), the capital accumulation equation
and the human capital threshold equation (22) which defines h∗t . We will express these four
equations in terms of z˜t, c˜t, h˜t and K˜t.
The labor force Lt is given by Lt = e
−λh∗t `tNt. Substituting this expression into the human
capital accumulation equation (1) and using (25), (27) and (28) implies
˙˜
ht = 1− γK
a
− A0
B0N0
K˜t
z˜t
e(λ−a−b)h˜t . (29)
Substituting the optimal capital use equation (21) into the no-arbitrage condition (23) and
imposing capital market clearing gives
ιt = q0A0e
−ah˜tf ′(z˜t)− δ − gq. (30)
Using this expression in the Euler equation (2) and applying the definitions in (25)-(27) gives
5
˙˜ct =
[
q0A0e
−ah˜tf ′(z˜t)− δ − gq − ρ− ηgc
] c˜t
η
. (31)
The capital accumulation equation is
K˙t = qt (Yt −Ntct)− δKt.
Using Yt = e
bh∗tBtLtf(z˜t) together with (25)-(28) we can rewrite this as
˙˜Kt =
[
q0A0e
−ah˜tf ′(z˜t)
θ(z˜t)
− q0N0 c˜t
K˜t
− δ − gK
]
K˜t. (32)
Finally, we turn to the human capital threshold equation (22). Imposing capital market
clearing in the optimal capital use equation (21) and then differentiating with respect to time
gives
R˙t
Rt
= −ah˙∗t + gA +
f ′′(z˜t)
f ′(z˜t)
˙˜zt.
We also have
σKL(z˜t) = − [1− θ(z˜t)] f
′(z˜t)
z˜tf ′′(z˜t)
.
Substituting these expressions into (22) and using (1), (25), (27), (28) and (30) yields
˙˜zt =
[
−b− γL + ν − δ − gq + q0A0e−ah˜tf ′(z˜t) + a A0
B0N0
K˜t
z˜t
e(λ−a−b)h˜t
θ(z˜t)
1− θ(z˜t)
]
z˜tσKL(z˜t)
θ(z˜t)
.
(33)
Equations (29), (31), (32) and (33) determine the transition dynamics.
Setting
˙˜
ht = ˙˜ct =
˙˜Kt = ˙˜zt = 0 implies that on the BGP the stationary values of these four
variables satisfy
6
A0
B0N0
K˜∗
z˜∗
e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗
= 1− γK
a
,
q0A0e
−ah˜∗f ′(z˜∗) = δ + gq + ρ+ ηgc,
q0A0e
−ah˜∗f ′(z˜∗)
θ(z˜∗)
− q0N0 c˜
∗
K˜∗
= δ + gK ,
θ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗) =
1
a− γK [b+ γL − ν − ηgc − ρ] .
Linearizing (29), (31), (32) and (33) about the stationary steady state therefore gives
˙˜
ht =
A0
B0N0
1
z˜∗
e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗
[
− (λ− a− b) K˜∗
(
h˜t − h˜∗
)
−
(
K˜t − K˜∗
)
+
K˜∗
z˜∗
(z˜t − z˜∗)
]
,
˙˜ct = q0A0e
−ah˜∗ c˜∗
η
[
−af ′(z˜∗)
(
h˜t − h˜∗
)
+ f ′′(z˜∗) (z˜t − z˜∗)
]
,
˙˜Kt = −aq0A0e−ah∗K˜∗ f (z˜
∗)
z˜∗
(
h˜t − h˜∗
)
− q0N0 (c˜t − c˜∗)
+ q0N0
c˜∗
K˜∗
(
K˜t − K˜∗
)
− q0A0e−ah∗K˜∗ f (z˜
∗)− z˜∗f ′(z˜∗)
(z˜∗)2
(z˜t − z˜∗) ,
˙˜zt = −a
[
q0A0e
−ah˜∗f(z˜∗)σ(z˜∗)− (λ− a− b) A0
B0N0
K˜∗e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗ σ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗)
](
h˜t − h˜∗
)
+ a
A0
B0N0
e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗ σ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗)
(
K˜t − K˜∗
)
− a A0
B0N0
K˜∗
z˜∗
e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗ σ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗) (z˜t − z˜
∗)
+
[
−q0A0e−ah˜∗ f(z˜
∗)− z˜∗f ′(z˜∗)
z˜∗
+ a
A0
B0N0
K˜∗e(λ−a−b)h˜
∗ θ′(z˜∗)σ(z˜∗)
θ(z˜∗) [1− θ(z˜∗)]2
]
(z˜t − z˜∗) .
This system of linear first order differential equations can be written as
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
˙˜
ht
˙˜ct
˙˜Kt
˙˜zt

=

α11 0 α13 α14
α21 0 0 α24
α31 α32 α33 α34
α41 0 α43 α44


h˜t − h˜∗
c˜t − c˜∗
K˜t − K˜∗
z˜t − z˜∗

and using the definitions of h˜∗, c˜∗, K˜∗ and z˜∗ to simplify we obtain
α11 = − (λ− a− b)
(
1− γK
a
)
,
α13 = − 1
K˜∗
(
1− γK
a
)
,
α14 =
1
z˜∗
(
1− γK
a
)
,
α21 = −aΛ c˜
∗
η
,
α24 = −Λ1− θ(z˜
∗)
σ(z˜∗)z˜∗
c˜∗
η
,
α31 = −aΛ K˜
∗
θ(z˜∗)
,
α32 = −q0N0,
α33 = q0N0
c˜∗
K˜∗
α34 = −ΛK˜
∗
z˜∗
1− θ(z˜∗)
θ(z˜∗)
,
α41 = −az˜
∗σ(z˜∗)
θ(z˜∗)
[
Λ− (λ− a− b)
(
1− γK
a
) θ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗)
]
,
α43 = (a− γK) z˜
∗
K˜∗
σ(z˜∗)
1− θ(z˜∗) ,
α44 = −Λ1− θ(z˜
∗)
θ(z˜∗)
− (a− γK) 1
1− θ(z˜∗) .
where
Λ = δ + gq + ρ+ ηgc.
The BGP is locally saddle-path stable if the matrix of α coefficients has two eigenvalues
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with negative real parts. We have not been able to characterize the sign of the eigenvalues
analytically, but, by imposing a functional form restriction on f(z) we can check the stability
of the BGP numerically. We assume f(z) = (1 + zα)
1
α
b
a+b where α is calibrated to ensure the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σKL = 0.6. Under this assumption there
exists a locally saddle-path stable BGP for all the parameter configurations used in Section 5.
Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating equation (16) with respect to γK yields
1
(1− θ)2
∂θ
∂γK
= − η − 1
a− γK
b− λ
a
− (η − 1)(γL +
b−λ
a γK)− λ+ ν + ρ
(a− γK)2 .
The first term on the right hand side is negative when η > 1 since Assumption 1 imposes b > λ.
The second term on the right hand side is negative by Assumption 2.iii which guarantees finite
utility on the BGP. It follows that an increase in γK reduces θ or, equivalently, that a reduction
in γK reduces labor’s share of income.
Differentiating equation (16) with respect to γL yields
1
(1− θ)2
∂θ
∂γL
= − η − 1
a− γK ,
which is negative if and only if η > 1. Thus, a reduction in γL increases θ and lowers labor’s
share of income.
Additional Cross-Section Specifications from Section 5
This section gives more detail about the relationship between wage growth and labor shares
across states and industries. The top panel in Table 5 shows that the relationship between these
variables is weaker when one considers a shorter time span. The baseline regression reported
in Panel A of Table 3 related average labor shares to wage growth over the period 1970 to
9
1997. Panel A of Table 5 shows the results of regressions that use shorter time spans, namely
1970-1990 and 1980-1997. For the most part, the estimated relationship between the variables
is weaker. One possible explanation might be that schooling decisions are based on expectations
of wage growth, and wage growth that is longer lasting is more likely to be incorporated into
expectations.
We also find that our estimates are sensitive to whether or not we include all of the industry-
state observations in the sample. Our baseline estimation excluded industry-states for which
there were fewer than 100 observations in the Census sample that we could use to calculate
average wages and average years of schooling. Panel B shows that, for the most part, the
estimated relationship between labor share and wage growth is less strong when we do not
exclude these observations. One explanation for this finding might be that individuals who are
employed in a large industry in some state view themselves as likely to remain in that industry
throughout their working life, or at least for a long time. Then, the expected wage growth in
that industry would be the main driver of their schooling decision. In contrast, those that work
in small industries may consider wage growth in other state sectors when making their school
choice, if they anticipate that they are quite likely to change industries at some point in their
career.
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Table 5: Wage Growth and Labor Shares, Alternative Specifications
(a) Panel A: Short Time Span
SIC Classification, 1970-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -2.21∗∗∗ -4.38∗∗ -1.70∗∗ -7.61∗∗∗
(0.48) (1.34) (0.56) (1.76)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.20 0.10 0.26 0.057
Observations 1060 1060 1060 1060
SIC Classification, 1980-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -0.63∗ -2.92∗∗∗ -1.60∗∗∗ -2.68∗
(0.29) (0.86) (0.46) (1.25)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.65 0.14 0.26 0.15
Observations 1706 1706 1706 1706
(b) Panel B: Including All Observations
SIC Classification, 1970-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -1.42∗∗∗ -5.18∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ -6.93∗∗∗
(0.35) (1.74) (0.37) (1.98)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.29 0.080 0.34 0.060
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818
NAICS Classification, 2000-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BEA BEA Census Census
Wage Growth -0.56∗∗ -1.97 -0.12 -3.89
(0.19) (2.10) (0.13) (2.00)
Instrument — Census — BEA
Implied value of a 0.65 0.19 2.96 0.094
Observations 2079 2079 2079 2079
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Value Added, Labor Compensation and Employment for each state-industry-year from
the BEA Regional Accounts; Wages and Years of Schooling calculated from the Census for 1970,
1980, 1990, 2000 and from the ACS for 2000-2012. Labor share is average across years of ratio
of labor compensation to value added. In Panel A, any state-industry-year for which there were
fewer than 100 observations in the Census/ACS was dropped. In Panels B, all observations were
kept. Columns 1 and 2 use wage growth computed from BEA as independent variable, whereas
columns 3 and 4 use wage growth from Census. Columns 1 and 3 estimated by OLS, columns
2 and 4 by IV. Each regression includes state fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and trends in
years of state-industry schooling with coefficients that vary by industry.
11
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1503 Camille Landais 
Arash Nekoei 
Peter Nilsson 
David Seim 
Johannes Spinnewijn 
Risk-Based Selection in Unemployment 
Insurance: Evidence and Implications 
1502 Swati Dhingra 
John Morrow 
Efficiency in Large Markets with Firm 
Heterogeneity 
1501 Richard Murphy 
Judith Scott-Clayton 
Gill Wyness 
The End of Free College in England: 
Implications for Quality, Enrolments and 
Equity 
1500 Nicholas Bloom 
Renata Lemos 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
Healthy Business? Managerial Education and 
Management in Healthcare 
1499 Thomas Sampson Brexit: The Economics of International 
Disintegration 
1498 Saul Estrin 
Daniel Gozman 
Susanna Khavul 
Equity Crowdfunding and Early Stage 
Entrepreneurial Finance: Damaging or 
Disruptive? 
1497 Francesco Caselli 
Alan Manning 
Robot Arithmetic: Can New Technology 
Harm All Workers or the Average Worker? 
1496 Nicholas Bloom 
Charles I Jones 
John Van Reenen 
Michael Webb 
Are Ideas Getting Harder to Find? 
1495 Christian Krekel Can Rising Instructional Time Crowd out 
Student Pro-Social Behaviour? Unintended 
Consequences of a German High School 
Reform 
1494 Lorenzo Caliendo 
Luca David Opromolla 
Fernando Parro 
Alessandro Sforza 
 
Goods and Factor Market Integration: A 
Quantitative Assessment of the EU 
Enlargement 
1493 Andrew E. Clark 
Sarah Flèche 
Warn N. Lekfuangfu 
The Long-Lasting Effects of Family and 
Childhood on Adult Wellbeing: Evidence 
from British Cohort Data 
1492 Daniel Paravisini 
Veronica Rappoport 
Philipp Schnabl 
 
Specialization in Bank Lending: Evidence 
from Exporting Firms 
1491 M.A. Clemens 
J. Hunt 
The Labor Market Effects of Refugee Waves: 
Reconciling Conflicting Results 
1490 V. Bhaskar 
Robin Linacre 
Stephen Machin 
 
The Economic Functioning of Online Drug 
Markets 
1489 Abel Brodeur 
Warn N. Lekfuangfu 
Yanos Zylberberg 
 
War, Migration and the Origins of the Thai 
Sex Industry 
1488 Giuseppe Berlingieri 
Patrick Blanchenay 
Chiara Criscuolo 
 
The Great Divergence(s) 
1487 Swati Dhingra 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
Veronica Rappoport 
Thomas Sampson 
Catherine Thomas 
 
UK Trade and FDI: A Post-Brexit Perspective 
 
1486 Christos Genakos 
Tommaso Valletti 
Frank Verboven 
 
The Compact City in Empirical Research: A 
Quantitative Literature Review 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
